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SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
New Hope for Infertile Couples
by Renee L. Menasche
he concept of surrogate
motherhood evolved approximately four years ago in
answer to the needs of some of the
infertile couples in America. The
surrogate mothering process is not
currently regulated by law.
Consequently, the viability of these
programs as well as the rights of those
individuals participating in the process
are questionable. This article explores
surrogate mothering arrangements,
identifies the myths surrounding them
and addresses the public policy issues
that will allow for their continued
viability. The author recommends that
legislation be promulgated which could
sanction surrogate mothering and would
protect the interests of all parties to the
process.
Overview
Studies indicate that there are
approximately 2.5 million infertile
married couples in America.! For
various reasons, many of these couples
are desirous of becoming parents. 2
Despite existing alternatives, however,
most of these couples are denied this
opportunity. Many infertile couples
have unsuccessfully undergone medical
procedures to correct the physical traits
that prevent conception. Others have
attempted the traditional adoption
procedures to no avail. The waiting list
for an agency adoption is several years. 4
Frequently couples are too old to be
considered as prospective adoptive
parents by the time their names reach
the top of the list. Independent
adoptions can sometimes be arranged. s
Experts in the field of adoption
,however, are difficult to find. Further,
birth mothers can be difficult to locate
and sometimes change their minds
shortly before or after birth. 6 If the
husband is the infertile partner, artificial
insemination of the wife by a sperm
donor is a scientifically viable
alternative. Approximately ten to
twenty thousand women each year
undergo this procedure. 7 In vitro
fertilization or "test tube babies" is
another avenue. At the present time,
under optimum circumstances, there is a
ten to twenty percent chance of success
with in vitro fertilization. 8 Thus, women

T
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with prior gynecological problems are
usually excluded from the program. 9
The psychologial effects of the
inability to have and to raise children
can be devastating.!O The inability to
bear a child is often considered a
violation of societal values. It may result
in marital problems, temporary sexual
dysfunction, increased alcohol
consumption, guilt and depression.!!
Although support groups have evolved
to help combat these difficulties,!2 they
are often not an adequate substitute for
the ability to raise a family.
Surrogate mothering evolved
approximately four years ago in answer
to the needs of some infertile couples.13
For those couples whose impediment to
childbearing is the wife's infertility,
another woman, the surrogate mother,
is artificially inseminated with the sperm
of the husband. To date, approximately
two hundred children nationwide have
been born by surrogates with the aid of
approximately twenty five surrogate
mothering agencies.!4
Two such agencies are presently
operating in Maryland.!S Surrogate
Motherhood, Inc., of Columbia,
Maryland is waiting its first birth during
the summer of 1984, has several other
pregnancies underway and expects the
number of pregnancies to continue to
increase.!6 For a fee, these agencies
coordinate infertile couples with
surrogate mothers and supervise the
artificial insemination process and the
pregnancy. The surrogate mother also
receives remuneration for her
participation.
Surrogate mothering agencies are
presently not regulated by law.17
Objection has been raised that surrogate
mothering arrangements violate existing
laws against the sale of children as well as
adoption and paternity laws. In
addition, public because of the belief
that these agencies encourage adultery,
exploit economically troubled women,
and are tantamount to prostitution.
Although surrogate mothering
agencies are unregulated!8 and diverse in
their administrative procedures and
requirements,!9 by legal necessity, all
have certain requisites in common. Prior
to insemination, the surrogate mother

and the agency execute a contract. If the
surrogate mother is married, her
husband is included as a party to the
contract. The salient features of this
contract include the surrogate mother's
and her husband's covenant to
relinquish custody of the child to the
natural father. The parties agree to take
all steps necessary to terminate their
parental rights. They further agree that
the surrogate mother will abstain from
sexual intercourse for a proscribed
period of time prior to and subsequent
to artificial insemination. Finally, the
surrogate mother's husband expressly
withholds his consent to the artificial
insemination of his wife for the purpose
of her bearing a child for which he will
have any legal responsibility. These
convenants are important, since under
Maryland law, a child conceived by the
artificial insemination of a married
woman, with the consent of her
husband, is their legitimate child. The
consent of the husband is presumed. 20
The convenant withholding consent to
artifical insemination rebutts the
presumption of legitimacy as to the
surrogate mother and her husband. As a
result of the surrogate mother's
convenant to abstain from sexual
intercourse, if paternity is judicially
scrutinized, the issue should be resolved
in favor of the natural father. Under the
contract custodial responsibility
remains with the natural father and he is
assured that, at the least, the surrogate
mother and her husband will use their
best efforts to judicially terminate their
parental rights.
Prior to insemination, the natural
father and the agency execute a second
contract. The germane provisions of this
contract are that, for a fee, the agency
will attempt to locate a potential
surrogate mother and will provide a
physician to perform the artificial
insemination. 2! The contract specifically
provides that no portion of the fee is for
the purpose of facilitating the adoption
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of any child. The reason for such a
provision is to avoid conflict with state
law. In Maryland, for example, it is
unlawful for an agency to charge or to
receive compensation for adoptive
placement.22 Thus, under this contract,
the ultimate adoption is not implicated
and the agency is not precluded from
charging or paying fees.
A third agreement between the
natural father, the surrogate mother and
her husband is made. This contract
includes those convenants previously
elucidated as to custody and parental
rights and obligations and further
specifies the renumeration the surrogate
mother will receive.23 For reasons
previously stated, the natural father's
wife is not a party to this contract.
Once all contracts have been
executed, the surrogate mother is
artificially inseminated with the sperm
of the natural father. The procedure is
timed to the ovulation period of the
surrogate mother and may have to be
repeated before it is successful.Z 4
Within seventy two hours of birth, 25
the natural father's and the surrogate
mother's names are entered on the birth
certificate. 26 Absent a contract judicial

determination, the effect thus far is that
the surrogate mother and the natural
father are the parents of the child. For
inheritance purposes, the presumption
that the child is the off-spring of the
surrogate mother's husband has been
rebutted by way of contract. Pursuant to
the contracts, the natural father, and by
necessary implication, his wife,
immediately receive the physical
custody of the child. To complete the
process, the natural father's wife
petitions the court for the adoption of
the child. The adoption process
however, presents legal and practical
difficulties.
As standard procedure, the surrogate
mother's consent to the adoption must
be obtainedP The birth certificate
contains the name and address of the
surrogate mother and this information is
available to the natural father upon
request. 28 However, the surrogate
mothering process is conducted on a
confidential basis. Thus, although the
surrogate mother and her husband
contractually agree to take all steps
necessary to terminate their parental
rights, absent an individual willing to act
as an intermediary to preserve that

confidentiality and a court amenable to
accepting and protecting same, the
consent of the natural mother cannot be
obtained. Her consent could not have
been obtained by the agency in that once
the agency recognizes that the surrogate
mothering process is for the purpose of
facilitating an adoption, it is precluded
from charging a fee. The effect is that the
adoptive mother may not be able to
meet the statutory mandates required to
complete the adoption process. In such a
case, a surrogate mother, who is a
disinterested party with respect to the
welfare of the child remains the child's
parent and the woman who cares for and
nutures him never achieves that status.

The Issues
A major issue of surrogate mothering
involves the question of public policy.29
In determining whether surrogate
mothering is inconsistent with public
policy, the judiciary must find: (1) that
it contravenes an established societal
interest; (2) injures the public or; (3) is
inconsistent with sound policy and good
morals. 30 Absent such a finding,
surrogate mothering should be
sanctioned and regulated in order to

Pecuniary gain
usually is not the
motivating factor
behind the
surrogate mother's
decision to
bear a child.
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meet the vital societal needs and to
protect the interests of all parties.
It has long been held that parents may
not barter or sell their children nor may
they demand pecuniary rewards as the
price for their consent to adoption. 33
Such contracts are void as against public
policy34 and the judiciary has applied
this principle to a myriad of situations so

The judiciary and
legislatures should
validate surrogate
mothering based
upon certain
provisions of the
United States
Constitution.
as not to open the door to the unlimited
sale of children. 35 The judiciary,
however, has created exceptions to that
general rule. Thus, in independent
adoptions, the adoptive parents may pay
the medical and hospital expenses
incurred for the care of the mother and
the child. 36 In Maryland, they may also
pay the reasonable and customary fees
for legal services. 37 The contract will be
sustained (1) if it does not contemplate
the severance of parental obligation;38
'(2) is in the best interests of the child;39
(3) does not contain pecuniary gain as
the natural mother's motivating factor;40
( 4) or transfers custody to one with a
legal responsibility to the child. 41
Surrogate mothering has opened an
unexplored area of the law which can
have a profound effect on the lives of
people. 42 The judiciary will tend to
construe the applicable existing laws
narrowly,43 preferring to await a
legislative sanction before recognizing
these programs. 44 For instance, in April
of 1983 circuit court Judge Jack Mudd
of Louisville, Kentucky denied a
surrogate mother the opportunity to
relinquish her parental rights based
upon the following rationale. 45 The
court strictly construed Kentucky's
presumption that the husband of the
surrogate mother is the father of the
child. 46 The court, however, could have
construed the presumption as a
rebuttable one, particularly if the
husband had contractually withheld his
consent and the surrogate mother had
abstained from sexual intercourse.
24-The Law Forum ISpring, 1985

In ruling as it did, the court indicated
that children required the protection of
someone other than those motivated by
personal gain.47 However, most
surrogate mothers are not financially
motivated. 48 Reports indicate that they
are motivated by their empathy for
infertile women,49 a desire to have an
impact on the lives of others,50 a desire
to help infertile women,51 and a desire to
do something truly "special" for
another. 52 For those women motivated
by the financial rewards, requiring them
to maintain their parental relationship
does not serve the best interest of the
child. The prohibition against baby
selling was designed to prevent the
exchange of money as an inducement to
the mother to give up her child. In
surrogate mothering, the natural mother
receives payment in consideration for
becoming pregnant and carrying the
child to term; she does not become
pregnant for the purpose of maintaining
a maternal relationship with the child. 53
Thus, a requirement that she maintain a
personal or financial relationship will
result in psychological difficulties for all
parties, financial hardship for the
surrogate mother and is not conducive
to the establishment of an appropriate
familial relationship.
The court was uncertain as to the
environment of the natural father's
home. 54 However, although the courts
concern was germane it could have been
satisfied by judicial inquiry at an
evidentiary hearing.
Fourthly, Judge Mudd felt that
children could not be sold as if they were
commodities. 55 The common law
prohibition against the sale of children
developed during an era in which a
woman, destitute and unable to
adequately earn a living, would sell her
child to a stranger. Clearly, that is the
sale of children and must be prohibited.
However, as previously indicated, this
prohibition is inapplicable to surrogate
mothering. Agreements to transfer
physical custody and a personal pledge
to terminate parental rights have been
consistently recognized 56 as long as they
meet at least one of the following
exceptions.
Once the child is born, validation of
the surrogate mothering contract is in
his best interests. 57 The surrogate
mother has stated via the contract that
she is not desirous of retaining physical
custody nor does she wish to assume and
exercise her parental obligations and
rights. 58 The natural father wants the
physical custody of the child and, in
conjunction with his wife, wishes to
assume and exercise his parental

obligations and rights. He and his wife
have planned for this child, made all
appropriate arrangements, and the child
has been living with them since birth.
Thus, since custody should not be
disturbed absent compelling reasons
affecting the child's welfare 59 and since
the maternal preference rule has been
abolished,60 the natural father should be
allowed to retain custody.
As previously indicated, pecuniary
gain usually is not the motivating factor
behind the surrogate mother's decision
to bear a child. 61 In fact, one mother has
seriously considered accepting no
renumeration. 62 Since the judiciary
would not invalidate other altruistic
acts, a surrogate mother should be
allowed to carry her actions to their
desired conclusion.
By transferring custody to the natural
father who already has a legal
responsibility toward the child63 the
fears that similar agreements will lead to
the sale of children are circumvented by
dealing with the natural parents and
close family members.64 The surrogate
mothering contracts should be
recognized and the natural father
permitted to retain custody of his child.
It follows that the surrogate mother
should be allowed to terminate her
maternal relationship in favor of the
natural father's wife, who cares for and
nurtures the child. It is appropriate that
her relationship be legally sanctioned
and she be charged with the
responsibilities concommittant to the
role she has chosen to undertake.

U.S. Constitution
The judiciary and legislatures should
validate surrogate mothering based
upon certain provisions of the United
States Constitution. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that, "no State shall deprive
any person of ... liberty without due
process of law. "65 Liberty denotes more
than mere freedom from bodily restraint
and includes the right of the individual
to marry, establish a home, raise
children and enjoy those privileges
recognized at common law as
fundamental to the pursuit of
happiness. 66 In determining whether a
privilege is fundamental the court looks
to the traditions and collective
conscience of the people. Those
privileges which are deeply rooted will
be deemed fundamenta1. 67 Applying
that test, the United States Supreme
Court has determined that in the area of
contraception there is a fundamental
right to marita168 and individua1 69
privacy. The United States Supreme

Court has yet to define the outer limits
of this right to privacy.71 This right has
been applied to decisions not to bear a
child72 but has not been tested as to the
decision to bear a child.
A state cannot regulate a woman's
decision to become pregnant by natural
means. 73 A contrary result would force
her to seek governmental permission
prior to pregnancy. However, in
surrogate mothering, the natural mother
becomes pregnant by way of artificial
insemination. Whether a pregnancy
thus created is constitutionally protected
remains untested. However, since Roe v.
Wade 74 gave women the constitutional
right to chose to terminate a pregnancy
by artificial means and most states have
sanctioned the use of artificial
insemination as to married couples,7s it
is only reasonable to conclude that a
surrogate mother's decision to create a
pregnancy is likewise protected.
When the framers wrote the United
States Constitution they "undertook to
secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized
the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect
.... They sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their
feelings and their sensations. 76
Recognizing that they could not foresee
what new changes and modifications
might be indispensible in later years,
they drafted the constitution in general
terms so as to endure for ages. 77
Mindful of the framer's intent, the
United States Supreme Court followed
in their footsteps when the court
announced the right of marital privacy
in the area of contraception. 78 By
utilizing the Fourteenth Amendment's
broad concept of personal liberty, the
Court opened the door to an expansive
array of activities that may be
constitutionally protected. Thus, the
constitutional protection afforded the
decision whether to bear or beget a child
should be extended to include an
infertile couple's right to beget a child by
way of surrogate motherhood. In fact,
the Court of Appeals of Michigan has
implicitly recognized this constitutional
protection in the area of surrogate
mothering. 79 While a state may make a
valued judgment favoring adoption over
surrogate motherhood80 and need not
remove obstacles in the path of infertile
couples that are not of its own
creation,8! to prohibit surrogate
motherhood and thus foreclose the right
of many infertile couples to beget a child
would be to frustrate the purpose of the
United States Constitution and to
preclude the way of life and harmony

previously sanctioned by the United
States Supreme Court. 82
While the right of privacy means
freedom from unwarranted governmental intrusion,83 not every state
regulation which infringes on that right
is invalid. Thus, despite the
constitutional protection afforded to
surrogate mothering, a state may
regulate these programs. To date, the
United States Supreme Court has not
elucidated one definitive test as to the
permissible scope of state regulation. At
a minimum, the regulation must be
reasonably related to the asserted
legislative purpose 84 and when a
regulation frustrates or heavily burdens
the exercise of a constitutional right, it
will be validated only by a compelling
state interest and must be narrowly
drawn to express only that interest. 8S
Thus, under the latter test, only a
regulation that directly and substantially
interferes with a constitutionally
protected right will be subjected to the
strictest standard of judicial review. 86 It
is impossible to postulate as to which
test the United States Supreme Court
will ultimately apply. Undoubtedly it
will depend upon the scope of the
regulation before the court and the
history of surrogate mothering
programs as of the date of judicial
review. 87
The following are some state interests
that may support legislative action:
1) A state may proscribe standards for
maternal eligibility, impose medical
requirements for a period prior to and
after birth, and prohibit abortion at the
point of viability. 88 The protection of
maternal health and the potentiality of
human life have long been accepted as
compelling state interests. 89
2) A state has an interest in insuring
the legitimacy and care of its children. It
may arguably prohibit unmarried
persons from participating in the
program and may mandate the extent
and· scope of parental obligations prior
to and upon the birth of the child.
3) A state has an interest. in insuring
that its children are not "bought and
sold."90 Thus, a state can mandate that
the surrogate mother not terminate her
parental obligations in favor of a person
not biologically related to the child. A
state may arguably regulate the profit
motive of the surrogate mothering
agencies and the surrogate mothers.
With respect to the agencies, most
should have no difficulty in being
classified as non-profit. 9 ! They could
remain viable on the revenue generated
by assisting natural fathers in locating
prospective surrogate mothers and all

personnel could continue to receive
appropriate remuneration.
If a state prohibited remuneration to
the surrogate mother or limited it to
nominal consideration, it would
effectively foreclose one means of
achieving parenthood for infertile
couples. Although pecuniary gain is not
the motivating factor for most surrogate
mothers,92 the majority might justifiably
not undergo pregnancy if the
remuneration was removed. 93 The
surrogate mothering process typically
extends for a period in excess of one
year. 94 During this time, the woman
subjects herself to the medical and
psychological hazards and discomforts
attendant to pregnancy and child birth.
In fairness, she has the right to expect
and receive remuneration. As a matter
of due process of law, such a regulation
would probably be invalid. The
common law prohibition against baby
selling is inapplicable to surrogate
motherhood. Thus, a regulation
predicated upon this premise would not
be reasonably related to the asserted
state purpose. The regulation would
directly and substantially interfere with
an infertile couple's constitutional right
to beget a child. Since the legislative
purpose is invalid, the state would have
no compelling interest with which to
validate their regulation.

Under the present
law, there is no
assurance that
the surrogate
mothering process

is not being
abused.
The fact that pregnant women who
release their babies for adoption are
prohibited from receiving compensation
is not dispositive. 9s Those women
would be paid as an inducement to
terminate their parental rights in favor
of a person not biologically related to
the child. This is precisely what the
common law prohibition sought to
prevent. Surrogate mothers, however,
are paid to become pregnant, to carry
the child to term, and to subject
themselves to the difficulties attendant
to pregnancy and child birth. The state
has other alternatives available to it to
.control the profit motive. That is, it may
Spring, 1985!The Law Forum-25

prescribe reasonable remuneration
commensurate with the time involved in
the process and the hazards and
discomforts concommittant with
pregnancy and child birth. As a practical
matter the profit motive is controlled by
individual self-restraint. At the present
time, the surrogate mother receives an
average of ten thousands dollars.96 On
the basis of a one year process she is
receiving one hundred and ninety three
dollars and seventy nine cents per week.
This is compatible with most entry level
or para-professional salaries with one
significant difference. Unlike her
counterpart in the traditional work
force, the surrogate mother subjects
herself to her "job" twenty four hours a
day throughout the process. Thus, she is
actually receiving one dollar and fifteen
cents per hour; a sum which is far below
the national minimum wage
requirements.
Finally, a state has a valid interest in
prohibiting unnatural sexual practices. 97
However, that interest cannot be
extended to include consensual artificial
insemination of the surrogate mother
with the sperm of the natural father. In
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney of
Richmond,98 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia upheld, and the United States
Supreme Court summarily affirmed, the
constitutionality of a criminal statute
which prohibited sodomy as applied to
homosexual aCtiVity. However, the
District Court did indicate that it was
proscribing homosexual activity
because it, "obviously had no portion of
marriage, home or family life. "99 Thus,
it can be inferred that to the extent a
non-traditional practice has a place in
marriage, home or family life, it would
receive the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Whether this inference will
be adopted by the United States
Supreme Court is uncertain. However,
an opinion of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas
is noteworthy. 100 By extending the
individual right of privacy to private
consensual sexual activity, the court
validated homosexual activity on the
ground that if it were not so protected,
the states would have the power to
intrude and regulate the intimate sexual
relations of married couples. lOI That
rationale is equally as meritorious when
applied to surrogate mothering. That is,
if on the basis of any of the interests
previously elucidated, a state may
prohibit surrogate mothering, then the
state would be equally as free to further
infringe on the right to individual
privacy and proscribe the traditional
26-The La\\' Forum Spullg. 1985

means of effectuating childbirth in order
to insure that those same interests are
protected. A state cannot so proscribe
the traditional means of effectuating
childbirth and, by analogy to Baker, the
state may not prohibit surrogate
mothering.
Maryland has statutorily sanctioned
the artificial insemination of married
women. l02 To date, the statute has been
applied to insure the legitimization of
the resulting off-spring when the
husband is infertile but his wife is
capable of bearing children. Surrogate
mothering applies only in the reverse
situation. That is, the husband is capable
of producing a child and it is his wife
who is infertile. If Maryland now
chooses not to apply that same statutory
protection to this latter group of
couples, the legislature and/ or the
judiciary will have created a
classification of individuals who are
being denied the equal protection of our
laws.
The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment lO3 guarantees
to all individuals the right to be free
from invidious discrimination in
statutory classifications and other
governmental activity.l04 In the context
of the family law, the United States
Supreme Court has developed two
groups of tests to determine the validity
of an equal protection challenge.
The first group involves
classifications that are not
constitutionally suspect or impinge on
constitutional fundamental rights.
Within this group, several different tests
have evolved. In 1972, the United States
Supreme Court required that the
classification, "be reasonable, not
arbitrary and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike. "105
This was a rigourous test and, in 1977,
the Court lightened the government's
burden by merely requiring that the
classification rationally further some
legitimate and articulated state
purpose. 106 Still later, in 1980, the
Court simply required that the
classification not rest on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of any
legitimate governmental objective. 107
This latter test creates a presumption of
constitutional validity. Thus, any of the
legitimate governmental interests
previously enumerated with respect to
due process would be sufficient to
support a governmental classification as
to types of infertile couples.
If the classification is based upon

criteria which are constitutionally
suspect l09 or impinges upon a
fundamental right protected by the
United States Constitution,11O the presumption of validity disappears and the
Court will strictly scrutinize the classification to determine whether it promotes
a compelling governmental interest. II I
The infertile couple has a fundamental
right to beget a child. Further, any
classification which would deny them
this right may be constitutionally
suspect. In determining whether a
classification is "suspect," the United
States Supreme Court has considered
two criteria that may be applicable to
surrogate mothering. First, the Court
has considered immutable characteristics determined at birth.ll2 T raditionally, this has been applied to classifications based upon race. However, if the
reason it has been so applied is because
race, like fertility, is a biological or
genetic factor not subject to change, a
liberal court may choose to apply this
criterion to surrogate motherhood.
Secondly, the court has considered
political underrepresentation. l13 T raditionally, this has been applied to
classifications based upon alienage. If,
however, the reason it has been so
applied is protection of minority
interests from legislation promulgated
by those representing the majority
viewpoint, again, a liberal court may
choose to apply this criterion to
surrogate motherhood. Should this
latter test be applied, any statutory
classification based upon types of
infertile couples will probably not
survive juducial scrutiny. The only state
interest that is compelling is the
common law prohibition against baby
selling. Since that interest is inapplicable
to surrogate motherhood, the classification should be invalidated and surrogate
mothering should be sustained.
Existing Legislation
Surrogate mothering programs meet a
vital societal interest. The utilization of
these programs will expand as the needs
of infertile couples increase and
surrogate mothering is recognized by
these couples as a viable alternative to
the traditional adoption process.
Without appropriate legislation, all
parties to the process are in jeopardy.
Under the present law, the payment
of compensation in connection with the
placement of a child for adoption is
unlawful. l14 Thus, a surrogate
mothering agency that charges a fee or
receives remuneration in consideration
of assisting a natural father in locating a
prospective surrogate mother may find
itself in violation of the law and subject

to criminal prosecution. I 15
An individual is prohibited from
placing children, "in homes or with
persons" unless it is licensed by the
state. 116 One of the goals of surrogate
mothering is the placement of the child
with its natural father. Surrogate
mothering agencies, however, are
exempt from the statutory mandate
because the child is placed in the custody
of its natural father. ll7 Under the
present law, there is no assurance that
the surrogate mothering process is not
being abused and that the interests of the
children born as a result of these
arrangements are being protected.
Every birth certificate is required to
include the name of the surrogate (birth)
mother. However, surrogate mothering
programs are conducted upon a
confidential basis. In order to achieve
anonymity, the surrogate mother's
name cannot appear on the birth
certificate. To that end, it may be
necessary for a party to delete the
surrogate mother's name from the birth
certificate, to provide or enter false
information for entry on the birth
certificate, or to alter the birth
certificate. In the event that the
surrogate mother's name is omitted
from the birth certificate, the certificate
will be deemed to be incomplete. I IS The
occurence of the latter event will place
the responsible party in violation of tht'

i

law l19 and will subject him to criminal
prosecution.1 2D
The ultimate goal of surrogatt'
mothering is the adoption of the child by
the natural father's wife. After the
surrogate (birth) mother's consent to
the adoption was obtained, 121 the
natural father may request a copy of the
birth certificate l22 in order to enable his
wife to comply with the adoption law.
However, such an action will place him
in breach of his contract which requires
him to maintain the anonymity of the
surrogate mother.
Surrogate mothering programs
envision that the child will be
considered to be the off-spring of the
natural father. However, under the
present law, a "child conceived by
artificial insemination of a married
woman with the consent of her husband
is the legitimate child of both of them for
all purposes. Consent of the husband is
presumed."123 In the event that the
surrogate mother is married, the law will
require that the child be deemed to be
the child of the surrogate mother's
husband. Surrogate mothering agencies
have eliminated this obstacle by
requiring the surrogate mother's
husband to contractually withhold his
consent to the artificial insemination of
his wife. This is problematic because, in
the event of judicial review, the court
may invalidate the contract, thus placing

the surrogate mother's husband in the
role of the child's parent.
Finally, several courts have applied
the common law prohibition against the
sale of children to surrogate mothering
and have invalidated these
arrangements. 124 In that event, the
natural father may not be allowed to
retain the custody of his child and
custodial responsibility may be placed
with the surrogate mother.
Additionally, the surrogate mother's
husband may be deemed to be the father
of the child and the natural father's wife
may not be allowed to complete the
adoption process.
As of May of 1984, six states had
legislation pending with respect to
surrogate mothering. In New York,
Assembly Bill 5537 125 and Assembly
Bill 6624 126 were pending before the
Assembly Committee on the Judiciary.
These bills would eliminate the fee to the
surrogate mother and would provide
statutory guidelines for the practice.
In Pennsylvania, House Resolution
109 127 was pending before the Rules
Committee. This resolution provided
for the appointment of a committee to
study surrogate mothering.
In Rhode Island, House Bill 6132 128
was before the House Judicial
Committee. This bill would add a
"Surrogate Motherhood" chapter to the
domestic relations code, would sanction
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payment to the surrogate mother, would
require a written contract, and would
require the natural father and his wife to
guarantee the adoption of the child.
In South Carolina, House Bill 2098 129
would give the Family Court
jurisdiction over surrogate mothering
arrangements and would provide
guidelines for the surrogate mothering
contracts, the artificial insemination
process, and the adoption of the child.
Further, the Family Court would be
required to order an investigation of the
fitness of the adoptive couple, by a
public or private child placement agency
or a court representative, prior to the
artificial insemination.
In Michigan, House Bin 4114 130 was
pending before the Judiciary
Committee. This bill eliminates the fee
to the surrogate mother, but provides
for the payment of those expenses
actually incurred by her, i.e., medical,
psychiatric or psychological expenses,
attorney fees, living expenses and loss of
wages. Further, the surrogate mother's
written consent to the termination of
her parental rights is required and is
effective upon the birth of the child.
Correspondingly, the bill requires the
natural father and his wife to assume all
parental rights upon the birth of the
child, regardless of whether the child is
born with "birth defects." In the event
that the natural father or his wife die
before the birth of the child, the bill
requires the survivor of them to assume
all parental responsibilities with respect
to the child. In the event that the natural
father and his wife die before the birth of
the child, the surrogate mother's
consent to the termination of her
parental rights is void and the surrogate
mother is required to assume parental
responsibility for the child. The bill
further requires that the following
documents be filed with the Probate
Court in the county in which the
surrogate mother resides. That is, the
surrogate motherhood agreement, the
surrogate mother's consent to the
termination of her parental rights, an
acknowledgement by the surrogate
mother's husband of the artificial
insemination of his wife, an
acknowledgement by the natural father
and his wife, that they will assume
parental responsibility for the child and
an affidavit from a psychologist or a
psychiatrist or an employee of a licensed
child placement agency that the
surrogate mother is capable of
consenting to the termination of her
parental rights. Interestingly, the
surrogate mother is permitted to
continuously update the Probate Court
28-Thc La\\' Forum SjJrmg, 198;

file so as to provide her most recent
name and address. Upon reaching the
age of majority, a child conceived by way
of surrogate motherhood is allowed to
obtain this information.
In New Jersey, Senate Bill 481 J3J was
pending before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. This bill presents a radical
departure from Assembly Bill 3139132
which would have made it a crime to
participate in or to materially assist in a
surrogate mothering arrangement. The
former bill would permit an infertile
couple to participate in a surrogate
mothering program only if the wife is
incapable of conceiving a child or
carrying a child to term without
significant risk to her life or if the wife
has been unable to conceive for one year
prior to the execution of the surrogate
mothering contract. Further, the bill
places the surrogate mothering process
under the supervision of the Family
Court, provides for the payment of all
medical expenses incurred by the
surrogate mother, sanctions the
payment of monetary compensation to
the surrogate mother, in an amount not
to exceed ten thousand dollars, and
requires term life and term health
insurance policies for the surrogate
mother and the infertile couple. The
surrogate mother's written consent to
the termination of her parental rights is
effective upon the birth of the child and
the infertile couple is required to
institute adoption proceedings within
ten days of the birth of the child. Finally,
the bill requires that the records of the
proceedings before the Family Court
and the medical records relative to the
artificial insemination be sealed.
As a result of the present law and the
sta tu tory ambiguities previously
elucidated, surrogate mothering
agencies in Maryland can flourish and
grow. However, it is appropriate for the
Maryland legislature to follow the lead
of other states and promulgate
legislature which would sanction
surrogate mothering and protect the
interests of all parties to the process.
At a minimum, this would require
special exceptions to those areas of the
law previously cited, i.e., adoption,
child placement,- vital records,
legitimacy and the common law
prohibition against the sale of children.
Further, to insure the protection of all
parties it may be appropriate to
implement some of the provisions of the
legislation pending in other states.
Conclusion
The presently existing adoption and
medical procedures are not meeting the
needs of many infertile couples who are

desirous of establishing a family.
Surrogate mothering is an answer to that
need and should be sanctioned. The
common law prohibition against the sale
of children is inapplicable to the
surrogate mothering process and the
Equal Protection Clause J33 and the Due
Process Clause J34 of the United States
Constitution require that surrogate
mothering be sanctioned, This can best
be accomplished by the promulgation of
legislation which would (1) protect the
best interest of the child, (2) provide
that surrogate mothering is conducted
without abuse and (3) insure that
surrogate mothering has no adverse
psychological effects on the surrogate
mother, the infertile couple or the child.
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